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Conditional Perfection is argued to arise when a sentence is silently conjoined with
an exhaustivized version of the same string. The proposed account, the ‘whole truth
theory’, is argued to not only capture Conditional Perfection but to also extend to
upper-bounding inferences and exhaustive answers. A crucial piece of the analysis
is the independently supported claim that bare conditionals are ambiguous between
universal and existential readings.
Keywords: Conditional Perfection, negative quantifiers, only, upper-bounding inferences,
scalar implicature, exhaustive answers, CEM, homogeneity of bare plurals.
1 Conditional Perfection
Conditionals are often taken to express necessary conditions in addition to sufficient
ones, a phenomenon known as ‘Conditional Perfection’. On a ‘perfected’ reading, if
p, q has the force of a biconditional iff p, q, rendering the following (a) sentences
equivalent to their (b) counterparts:
(1) a. If you mow the lawn I’ll give you $50. (cf. Geis & Zwicky 1971)
b. If and only if you mow the lawn I’ll give you $50.
(2) a. If you work hard you’ll succeed.
b. If and only if you work hard you’ll succeed.
Though Conditional Perfection is common, it is, as Lilje (1972)’s (3a) shows,
by no means obligatory; (3a) is not taken to mean that the relevant cactus is not an
Astrophytum if and only if it grows native to Idaho. Nor does (3b) preclude that
taking a vaporetto boat will also reveal what the famous Venetian waterway looks
like:
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(3) a. If this cactus grows native to Idaho, then it’s not an Astrophytum.
b. If you look at this Canaletto painting you’ll get a good idea of what the
Canal Grande looks like.
And even when present, Conditional Perfection can be cancelled:
(4) If you work hard you’ll succeed. And if you’re lucky, you’ll succeed as well.
All of this suggests that Conditional Perfection is not tied directly to the semantics
of conditionals but is rather a pragmatic phenomenon.1
Various proposals have sought to analyze Conditional Perfection in pragmatic
terms, and many, if not most of them draw a parallel to upper-bounding inferences
(e.g., van der Auwera 1997, Cornulier 1983, Ducrot 1969, Horn 1972, Matsumoto
1995). The similarities between Conditional Perfection and upper-bounding infer-
ences are indeed striking. Like Conditional Perfection, upper-bounding inferences
can be lacking, as is the case in understatement:
(5) a. John had a few drinks.
b. Mary got a little upset.
And like Conditional Perfection, upper-bounding inferences can be cancelled:
(6) a. Ben ate some of the biscotti.
b. Ben ate some of the biscotti. In fact, he ate all of them.
Given the affinity between Conditional Perfection and upper-bounding infer-
ences, it is tempting to explain Conditional Perfection as a scalar implicature (SI),
the primary means of analyzing upper-bounding inferences. It has, however, proven
difficult to do this on the standard neo-Gricean approach, and, as I show, difficulties
also persist on the new ‘grammatical’ approach to SI. I argue that though Conditional
Perfection cannot be reduced to SI, upper-bounding inferences and Conditional
Perfection are indeed related; I propose a unified account of both that also extends to
exhaustive answers, what I call the ‘whole truth’ theory.
1 Note also that so-called biscuit conditionals cannot be perfected, and neither can even if conditionals,
(e.g., Horn 2000):
(i) (a) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some.
(b) If you’re thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge.
(ii) (Even) if the U.S. halts the bombing, North Vietnam will (still) not agree to negotiate.
One thing biscuit and even if conditionals have in common is that their consequents are taken to hold
true regardless of whether the antecedent is true or not. It therefore makes sense that it should not
be felicitous to ‘perfect’ them; if the consequent is true regardless of whether the antecedent is, the
antecedent can hardly be taken to express a necessary condition for the truth of the consequent.
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2 Trying to derive Conditional Perfection as SI, neo-Gricean manner
On the standard neo-Gricean account upper-bounding inferences are derived as
SIs by negating alternative sentences appealing to the Maxim of Quantity and a
subsequent ‘epistemic step’ from ‘not believing that p’ to ‘believing that not p’ (e.g.,
Grice 1989). The alternatives are like the original except there is a semantically
stronger expression in place of the original scalar expression (e.g., Horn 1972):
(7) a. Ben ate some of the biscotti. Sentence itself
b. Ben ate all of the biscotti. Stronger alternative
c.
It is not the case that Ben ate all of
the biscotti.
Negation of stronger alternative
Unfortunately, a neo-Gricean account of SI does not easily extend to Conditional
Perfection. One alternative to if that comes to mind is iff. But though iff p q is
stronger than if p q, iff is not a real lexical item and, moreover, the negation of iff p,
q does not derive Conditional Perfection but its opposite (Atlas & Levinson 1981):
(8) a. If you work hard you succeed. Sentence itself
b.




It is not the case that if and only if
you work hard you succeed.
Negation of stronger alternative
An ‘unconditional’ alternative, where the alternative to if p q is not iff p q but if p
or not p q, is less obviously wrong (cf. van der Auwera 1997, Matsumoto 1995):
(9) a. If p q. Sentence itself
b. If p or not p q Stronger alternative
c.
The following is not the case: if p or
not p q.
Negation of stronger alternative
But it still raises issues. One is of a conceptual sort: if p or not p seems a strange
alternative to if p (Horn 2000). The second difficulty is of an empirical nature
(von Fintel 2001). (9c) together with (9a) amounts to: It is not the case that if
not p q. Conditional Perfection now only follows if it is not the case that if not
p q is equivalent to if not p not q. This, however, would require an analysis of
conditionals where the negation of an entire conditional is equivalent to the negation
of its consequent, in other words an analysis that supports the Conditional Excluded
617
Herburger
Middle (CEM). But of course the standard ‘universal’ or ‘(variably) strict’ analysis
of bare conditionals, given in (10) and (11), does not have this property, cf. (12):2
(10) Universal analysis of conditionals:
If p q is true exactly when all p-cases are q-cases.
(Wallis 1687, Sommers 1982)
(11) (Variably) strict conditional:
a. If p q is true exactly when all p-worlds are q-worlds.
(Lewis 1918)
b. If p q is true exactly when all closest p-worlds are q-worlds.
(Lewis 1973)
(12) Lack of CEM of universal/strict analyses of conditionals:
¬[∀x : (p-case(x)] q-case(x)< [∀x : (p-case(x)]¬q-case(x)
In sum, if the antecedents of bare conditionals have, as is standardly assumed,
universal force, then, all scale issues aside, appealing to an unconditional stronger
alternative to if p q, if p or not p q, does not derive Conditional Perfection as an SI.
3 Conditional Perfection as an Informativeness or R-based inference
In view of the problem posed by the iff alternative to if, Atlas & Levinson (1981) pro-
pose to derive Conditional Perfection (along with other inferences) not as a Quantity
or Q-based inference but as an inference from a Principle of Informativeness. This
principle invites the hearer to infer a contextually implicit ‘best’, i.e. semantically
strongest interpretation, over and above what is actually said. In an instance of
Conditional Perfection the ‘best’ alternative is said to be the perfected one. But,
one may ask, why does the unconditional alternative, which is also semantically
stronger, not count as the ‘best’ interpretation instead? Without a specific account of
where the ‘better’ alternatives come from, this account seems incomplete.3
2 While the variably strict conditional analysis in Lewis 1973 does not support CEM, the analysis
which it is a response to, that in Stalnaker 1968, does. Since on Stalnaker’s analysis a conditional
is said to be true exactly when in the single closest possible world where the antecedent is true the
consequent is true also, it is not the case that if p q comes out as equivalent to if p then not q. Lewis
(1973) objects to this account on grounds that there is not always a single closest possible world
where the antecedent is true (cf. If this line were over one inch long..., for which for any close world
that it is true in there will be another closer one, and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots..., for which
presumably the worlds were both composers are French or both are Italian are tied in closeness).
Another argument that Lewis adduces against Stalnaker’s proposal is that it conflates the difference
between would and might conditionals. Both arguments are addressed in Stalnaker 1981.
3 This is a version of the ‘symmetry problem’ discussed in the literature on scalar implicature, see,
e.g., Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012.
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Like Atlas & Levinson (1981), Horn (2000) also analyzes Conditional Perfection
as an instance where someone means more than they say but where this does not
follow from Grice’s Maxim of Quantity (Q-based inference). Rather than appealing
to a Principle of Informativeness, he opts for an R-based implicature. Analogous to
how I was able to solve the problem R-implicates that the speaker solved it, if is said
to generally be understood as R-implicating the stronger if and only if. But, though
intriguing, the parallel seems less than perfect in that regular R-based inferences seem
more lexicalized and and less contextually dependent than Conditional Perfection.
Evidently, Conditional Perfection is felicitous in certain contexts and not in
others, and it seems reasonable to say that pragmatic theory is in charge of explaining
this. It is a separate question, I believe, how exactly Conditional Perfection comes
about in those instances where it is pragmatically felicitous. Neither the Principle of
Informativeness nor a reduction to an R-based inference seems to fully explain that,
leaving one wondering if the generation of Conditional Perfection is not somehow
related to that of upper bounding inferences after all. In what follows I consider two
more options. One is to employ the grammatical account of SI and see if it extends
to Conditional Perfection; I argue it does not. The other is to explore a new account
of upper-bounding inferences, one that also encompasses Conditional Perfection,
and the exhaustiveness of answers to questions. This is the ‘whole truth’ theory.
4 Can we derive Conditional Perfection on a grammatical account of SI?
Whereas the standard neo-Gricean account of upper-bounding inferences has as
its driving force the Cooperative Principle, which is thought to guide not only
conversation but human cooperation more generally, on the more recent grammatical
approach to upper-bounding inferences as SIs they are attributed directly to grammar:
(13) Grammatical account of SI:
SI is derived by embedding (part of) S under O/Exh.
(e.g., Chierchia et al. 2012).
O/Exh can be thought of as a Rooth-style propositional operator, as in (14) (cf.
Rooth 1985), or, alternatively, O/Exh can be defined over sentences, as in (15) (cf.
Fox & Katzir 2011).
(14) [[O/Exh]] (A<st>)(p<st>)(w)⇔ p(w)∧∀q(q ∈ NW (p,A))→¬q(w))
NW (p,A) = q ∈ A : p does not entail q (Fox 2007)
(15) [[O/Exh S]] = 1 iff [[S]] = 1 ∧∀S′(S′ ∈ NW (S,A)) → [[S′]] = 0
The non-weaker alternatives that are negated by Exh/O are given by scalar items,
which behave as if they were inherently focused (cf. Krifka 1995, Fox & Katzir
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2011). Given the universal analysis of bare conditionals in (10)-(11), a ‘grammatical’
approach to Conditional Perfection would amount to O/Exh if p q. The alternatives
are signaled by focus on the scalar element, for example hard in (2a):
(16) a. p: If you work HARD you succeed.
b. p′: If you work LITTLE you succeed.
c. p′′: If you DON’T WORK AT ALL you succeed.
Though the grammatical theory’s O/Exh is in both instances fashioned after the
overt only there remains a difference between the two, namely that under Exh/O the
prejacent is fully asserted, which in fact captures that the prejacent under O/Exh is
the basic, non-strenghthened meaning of the sentence, whereas the prejacent of only
expresses something more akin to a presupposition or something more pragmatically
backgrounded (see below).
Does this approach capture Conditional Perfection? Because the conditional
prejacent has universal force O/Exh if p q would indeed capture that perfected condi-
tionals express sufficient conditions: (2a) would be predicted to entail a universally
quantified prejacent ‘All cases where you work hard are cases where you succeed’.
Unfortunately, though, the very same universal force of the conditional prejacent
that would capture the sufficient condition part would mean that O/Exh if p q would
fail to capture that perfected conditionals also express necessary conditions: If p′ is
a relevant alternative to p, what is negated by O/Exh is again a universally quantified
sentence:
(17) ¬[[∀x : p′-case(x)]q-case(x)]
When applied to (2a), (17) just excludes that all cases of working little, etc. are cases
where you succeed. This, as we saw, is too weak to capture that (2a) rules out that
any instances of not working hard lead to success.
5 The whole truth theory
In light of the difficulties of deriving Conditional Perfection as a neo-Gricean or
‘grammatical’ SI, I would like to explore a different proposal (though one that is
clearly inpired by these accounts):
(18) The whole truth theory: (1st version)
Conditional Perfection and upper-bounding inferences arise as logical entail-
ments when a sentence S is silently conjoined with only S, resulting in the
conjunction S and only S. S and only S is then taken to express ‘the truth and
the whole truth’. If no upper-bounding inference or Conditional Perfection is
intended, the and only S conjunct is absent. Whether Conditional Perfection
or an upper-bounding inference is intended is a pragmatic matter.
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On the whole truth theory the perfected reading of (2a) follows from the conjunc-
tion in (19a) and the upper-bounding inference of (7a) derives, in parallel fashion,
from the conjunction in (19b). Since in both instances only the first conjunct is
pronounced, an unstrengthened sentence sounds the same as a strengthened one; it
is the pragmatic context which helps the hearer figure out which interpretation is
intended.
(19) a. If you work HARD you succeed and only if you work HARD do you
succeed.
b. Ben ate SOME of the biscotti and Ben only ate SOME of the biscotti.
In (19a) the first conjunct if you work HARD you succeed has the meaning it normally
has; it expresses that hard work is a sufficient condition for success. And just like
its overt counterpart, the second, silent conjunct and only if you work HARD do
you succeed expresses what it normally expresses, namely that hard work is a
necessary condition for success. Conditional Perfection follows. But how exactly
does Only if you work hard do you succeed come to mean what it means? This in
fact constitutes a semantic puzzle, to which I now turn, before then returning to
Conditional Perfection.
6 The semantics of only if conditionals
6.1 The challenge
Only if conditionals like those in (20) pose a challenge because combining the
(variably) strict conditional analysis of bare conditionals, repeated in (21), with a
semantics for only, for example (22), does not give us their meaning.
(20) a. Only if you work hard do you succeed.
b. Doug only walks the dog when Sid’s not around.
(21) Universal analysis of conditionals:
If p q is true exactly when all p-cases are q-cases.
(22) [[only S]] = 1 iff [[S]] = 1 ∧∀S′(S′ ∈ NW (S,A)) → [[S]] = 0
S expresses backgrounded information 4
4 There exists a long-standing debate (recounted in e.g., Horn 2002) as to whether (part of) the prejacent
of only is presupposed (‘assymetricalists’) or whether it is entailed (‘symmertricalist’). Both views
have their justification, and are, in fact, not incompatible: we can say that the prejacent is entailed as
part of the truth-conditional meaning but in a pragmatically backgrounded or ‘assertorically inert’
manner, (e.g., Atlas 1993, Herburger 2000, Horn 2002). Support comes from Atlas (1993)’s point
that I love only you is not a mere presupposition failure if the speaker does not love the addressee.
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One issue we encounter is that only if conditionals express necessary conditions.
Just as with conditionals under O/Exh, on the universal analysis conditionals under
only are merely predicted to rule out that all alternative cases are q-cases. But (20a),
for example, does not just deny that all cases of not working hard lead to success
but says that none of them do. In other words, assuming a universal prejacent leads
to an analysis that does not capture the exclusionary force that we observe. The
second issue is this: Because the conditional prejacent is, by hypothesis, universally
quantified, (20a) is predicted to entail in a backgrounded manner that hard work
guarantees success. But only if conditionals do not really suggest in any way that
the antecedent expresses sufficient conditions for the truth of the consequent. If they
did, they would have a force similar to that of bi-conditionals. That they do not
is already noted by McCawley (1974) and becomes evident when we compare the
coherent (23a) with the contradictory (23b):
(23) a. Only if you work hard do you succeed but hard work does not guarantee
success. coherent
b. If and only if you work hard you succeed but hard work does not guarantee
success. contradictory
One can try to solve the problem regarding the exclusionary force by appealing
to CEM (von Fintel 1997)5 but this move will not solve the problem with the
overly strong presupposition/backgrounded entailment generated by the conditional
prejacent of only illustrated in (23); this will persist as long as we assume that the
bare conditional prejacent of only has universal force.
6.2 The duality of conditionals
The meaning of only if conditionals becomes less of a puzzle if we assume that bare
conditionals are actually ambiguous (Herburger 2015).
(24) Conditional Duality:
Normally, bare conditionals have universal force but in downward entailing
contexts, bare conditionals have, all things being equal, existential force.
5 In order to keep the advantages of the Lewis style variably strict conditional and, at the same time,
have CEM to deal with the exclusionary force of only if conditionals, von Fintel (1997) translates
if-clauses as generic rather than universal quantifiers. He then appeals to the ‘homogeneity’ of generic
quantifiers under negation (see the observation in Fodor 1970 and Löbner 2000 that Women don’t
like doing dishes, e.g., is a generic claim about women’s dislikes, see also discussion of this below)
to derive CEM and, with it, the exclusionary force of only if conditionals. Since, however, generic
quantification is somewhat weaker than universal quantification, this analysis would not seem to
derive the full exclusionary force of only if conditionals (Cohen 2004).
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It should be noted at this point that Dekker (2001) posits an operator (*) for con-
ditionals in downward entailing contexts. His * operator turns a material conditional
into a conjunction:
(25) [λq.p→ q]* = λq.¬[p→¬q] = λq.[p∧q]
Obviously, I do not posit an operator, but rather an ambiguity. Nor do I assume
that bare conditionals have the semantics of the material conditional, or that the truth-
conditions of if in downward entailing contexts can really be translated as conjunction
(see appendix A). That said, by recognizing duality for bare conditionals, my analysis
is clearly similar in spirit to that in Dekker 2001, see also Higginbotham 1986, 2003,
appendix A.
Conditional Duality results in the conditional prejacent of only in (20a) being
interpreted existentially as in (26). Since the alternatives ruled out by only all have
the form in (27), the exclusionary force of only if conditionals now follows directly
from the semantics of existential quantification under negation; (20a) amounts to
something like (28).6
(26) [∃x :You-work-hard-case(x)] You-succeed-case(x)
(27) ¬[∃x : p′-case(x)]q-case(x)
(28) Assertion of (20a):
It is not the case that in some (any) cases where you work a little you succeed.
It is not the case that in some (any) cases where you work when you feel like
it you succeed. Etc.
The backgrounded entailment of only if conditionals also fall into place. The overly
strong entailment generated by the strict conditional is now gone, and the distinction
between only if conditionals and bi-conditionals is preserved. Moreover, from the
existential force of the conditional and the meaning of only it follows that (20a)
entails that at least in some cases hard work may lead to success. This explains that
(20a) can be used to encourage someone to work hard, the argument being that hard
work increases the chances for success, even if it doesn’t guarantee it. Similarly, (29)
6 The assumption here is that only creates a downward entailing context. This has to be relativized to
its negative component, excluding the pragmatically backgrouded prejacent (e.g., von Fintel 1999,
Horn 2002). Thus, the inference from (ia) to (ib) goes through provided we independently know
that someone went to Isla Margarita, off the coast of mainland Venezuela. Other instances where
‘assertorically inert’ material has to be abstracted away from are discussed in Horn 2002.
(i) a. Only Juanita went to Venezuela.




is predicted to be misleading because it entails that there is a possibility of drinking
kale juice and living to be 130; as far as we know that is simply false because, no
matter what juice you consume, the odds of living to 130 are zero:
(29) Only if you drink kale juice do you live to be 130.
McCawley (1974) and von Fintel (1997) already toyed with the idea that conditionals
under only have existential rather than universal force, but, in the end, rejected this
possibility because it seemed stipulative. But there is some independent support.
6.3 Negative quantifiers and Conditional Duality
Support for Conditional Duality comes from conditionals under negative quantifiers,
which pose a long-standing problem (Higginbotham 1986, 2003; Dekker 2001; von
Fintel 1998; von Fintel & Iatridou 2002; Leslie 2009, a.o.) that can be summarized
as follows: Translating the conditional as a strict conditional works well when the
conditional is embedded under a universal quantifier, but not when in the scope of a
negative quantifier. The issue is that (31b) says that for no student do all instances
of goofing off result in success when (30b) in fact means that for no student do any
instances of goofing off result in success.
(30) a. Every student will succeed if he works hard.
b. No student will succeed if he goofs off. (Higginbotham 1986)
(31) a. [Every x: Student(x)] [∀y: Work-hard(x, at y)] Succeed(x, at y)
b. [No x: Student(x)] [∀y: Goof-off(x, at y)] Succeed(x, at y)
Matters improve once we assume Conditional Duality (Herburger 2015). While
(31a) retains a logical form where the conditional has universal force, (30b) now has
a logical form where the conditional has mere existential force. This captures that
the conditional excludes that any goofing off is compatible with success:
(32) [No x: Student(x)] [∃y: Goof-off(x, at y)] Succeed(x, at y)
The analysis works straightforwardly (for other proposals see appendix A), and,
importantly, it provides independent support for the proposed duality analysis of
conditionals under only. Given that negation creates the negative environment par
excellence we would expect that negated conditionals provide a further argument for
Conditional Duality. Some arguments for this are briefly discussed in appendix B.
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7 Parallels between bare conditionals and bare plurals
Having argued for the duality of bare conditionals, I would now also like to briefly
consider bare plurals. As is well-known, bare plurals exhibit generic or (quasi)-
universal readings alongside their existential readings. Strikingly, however, bare
plurals that normally have a (quasi)-universal reading because they combine with an
individual level predicate show an existential reading when embedded under only. As
already noted in McCawley 1974, (33b) merely rules out that non-Southerners voted
for Humphrey but does not entail that Southerners in general voted for Humphrey.
Similarly, unlike in (34a) no genericity seems to be present in (34b).
(33) a. Southerners voted for Humphrey.
b. Only SOUTHERNERS voted for Humphrey.
(34) a. Men smoke cigars.
b. Only MEN smoke cigars.
The lack of (quasi-)universal force of SOUTHERNERS in (33b) and MEN in
(34b) suggests we should extend the duality thesis (Herburger 2015):
(35) Duality of bare conditionals and bare plurals:
Normally, bare conditionals and bare plurals that combine with individual
level predicates have universal force, but in downward entailing contexts they
have, all things being equal, existential force.
The duality of bare plurals may, in addition to explaining their meaning under
only, also help us make sense of the ‘homogeneity’ that bare plurals are known
to show under negation (e.g., Fodor 1970, Löbner 2000, von Fintel 1997); we can
now say that (36), for example, amounts to saying that Austrians generally are not
familiar with the The Sound of Music because even though the bare plural Austrians
combines with an individual level predicate, it translates as an existential quantifier
as it appears in a negative context, as shown in (37):7
(36) Austrians don’t know The Sound of Music.
(37) ¬[∃X : ∃x(X(x)∧∀y(X(y)→Austrians(y)))] ∃z(X(z)∧Knows-The-Sound-
of-Music(z))
7 A similar idea is already discussed in by Krifka (1996), who argues that plural definite descriptions
are ambiguous between universal and existential readings. This, together with the ‘strongest meaning
hypothesis’ favors, barring separate pragmatic factors, the existential reading in downward entailing
contexts but the universal one elsewhere. For a different account of the homogeneity of plural definite
descriptions see, however, Schein 2015. While I posit existential/universal ambiguity for bare plurals
and bare conditionals and observe that the existential reading often appears in downward entailing
contexts and the universal reading elsewhere I do not want to commit at this point to anything beyond
that. I have not explored yet whether this distribution can be attributed to the strongest meaning
hypothesis or whether it is due to something else.
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8 Extension: The whole truth theory and exhaustive answers to questions
If we now turn to answers we find that, curiously, bare plurals used as exhaustive
answers exhibit a universal reading:
(38) A: Who smokes cigars?
B: MEN do./MEN smoke cigars.
If the exhaustiveness of answers were merely derived by embedding the answer
under O/Exh, (38B) should pattern with (34b) and it should lack the (quasi-)universal
force that it seems to show on top of the exhaustive force. The universal force of
(38B) suggests instead that it is interpreted along the lines of (39):
(39) MEN smoke cigars and only MEN smoke cigars.
More generally, the interpretation of (38) suggests the whole truth theory should
be extended to exhaustive answers:
(40) The whole truth theory: (2nd version)
Conditional Perfection, upper-bounding inferences and the exhaustiveness of
answers (to explicit or implicit questions) arise as logical entailments when
a sentence S is silently conjoined with and only S. S and only S is taken
to express ‘the truth and the whole truth’. If no upper-bounding inference,
Conditional Perfection or exhaustiveness is intended, the and only S conjunct
is absent. Whether Conditional Perfection, an upper-bounding inference or
an exhaustive reading of an answer is intended is a pragmatic matter.
Given (40), we now expect if-clauses that are used as exhaustive answers to be
subtly different in meaning from only if-answers. Consider (41):
(41) A: Do you ever go swimming in the morning?
B: If I’m on vacation.
B’: Only if I’m on vacation.
(41B’) entails that you don’t swim when not on vacation, while (41B) only
entails it when read exhaustively. What is of particular interest is that when read
exhaustively, (41B) is easily taken to imply that you swim regularly when on va-
cation, while (41B’) tends to mean that there are some morning swims when on
vacation (and only then). This suggests that when (41B) is an exhaustive answer it
is interpreted on the S and only S schema, as ‘I go swimming in the morning when
I’m on vacation and I only go swimming in the morning when I’m on vacation’.
Thus (41B) in the end has the logical form in (42): The first conjunct represents the
meaning of the first instance of S, which since it is outside of a downward entailing
context involves universal quantification, helping capture the quasi-universal or
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generic force we observe in (41B) in contradistinction with (34b). The second and
the third conjuncts represent the meaning of and only S, with the second conjunct
asserting (in a backgrouded manner) the existentially quantified prejacent and the
third conjunct negating alternatives, which are, crucially, existentially quantified,
thus capturing the exhaustiveness of the answer.
(42) [[∀x : R(x)∧ I’m-on-vacation(x)] Go-Swimming(x)]
∧ [[∃y : R(y)∧ I’m-on-vacation(y)] Go-Swimming(y)]
∧¬[[∃z : R(z)∧ I’m-working(z)] Go-Swimming(z)] ∧ ...
A connection between Conditional Perfection and the exhaustiveness of answers
has not gone unnoticed (e.g., Cornulier 1983; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984). I argue
the exhaustiveness of answers is not due to simple embedding under an exhaustifying
operator but follows from the S and only S schema.
9 Implementation: If-clauses as plural definite descriptions
9.1 The basic analysis of conditionals
To keep matters simple I have employed an analysis of conditionals according to
which if-clauses denote quantifiers over individual cases. But there are reasons to
think that if-clauses should be analyzed as topic-like plural definite descriptions of
possible events or situations and that adverbs of quantification should interpreted
in-situ as taking scope over the consequent (Schein 2003, cf. also Schlenker 2004;
Bhatt & Pancheva 2006). On this more detailed analysis, (43) has the logical form
in (44), saying ‘The possible events where you work hard are such that (a) for most
among them there are related events (b) all of which are events where you succeed
(c).’
(43) If you work hard you usually succeed.
(44) [ιX : ∀e(X(e)↔ you-work-hard(e))] (a)
[Most e′ : X(e′)][∃X ′ : ∃e′′(X ′(e′′)∧∀e′(X ′(e′′)→ R(e′′,e′)))] (b)
[∀e′′′ : X ′(e′′′)] you-succeed(e′′′) (c)
On this account, the word if clearly has meaning (cf. also Gillies 2010).
(45) [[if ]] = λ f<et>.λg<Et>.[ιE : ∀e(E(e)↔ f (e) = 1]g(E) = 1
Following Schein (2003), I further assume that the non-monotonicity of con-
ditionals (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973) stems from a tacit ceteris paribus clause
which functions like a stacked antecedent and which in the example at hand would
be between (b) and (c), giving us (46) as the full logical form for (43). Important
though this is for the overall analysis of conditionals, due to limitations of space I
abstract away from the ceteris paribus clause in the remainder of the paper.
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(46) [ιX : ∀e(X(e)↔ you-work-hard(e))] (a)
[Most e′ : X(e′)][∃X ′ : ∃e′′(X ′(e′′)∧∀e′(X ′(e′′)→ R(e′′,e′)))] (b)
[ιE ′′ : ∀e′′′ : X ′′(e′′′)↔Ceteris-paribus(e′′′,e′)] (c)
[∀e′′′ : X ′′(e′′′)] you-succeed(e′′′) (d)
If we assume that covert adverbs are interpreted like their overt counterparts
the duality of bare conditionals now amounts to an ambiguity of the tacit adverb
quantifying over the consequent. Thus (47), which represents the universal reading,
has a universal quantifier beginning the second line. Its existential counterpart is
identical except that the quantifier is existential, cf. (48b):
(47) [ιX : ∀e(E(e)↔ you-work-hard (e))] (a)
[∀e′ : E(e′)][∃E ′ : ∃e′′(E ′(e′′)∧∀e′(E ′(e′′)→ R(e′′,e′)))] (b)
[∀e′′′ : E ′(e′′′)]you-succeed (e′′′) (c)
(48) [ιX : ∀e(E(e)↔ you-work-hard(e))] (a)
[∃e′ : E(e′)][∃E ′ : ∃e′′(E ′(e′′)∧∀e′(E ′(e′′)→ R(e′′,e′)))] (b)
[∀e′′′ : E ′(e′′′)]you-succeed(e′′′) (c)
The ambiguity of the covert adverb recalls that of ever, which in certain contexts
can be read universally but in downward entailing contexts is read existentially,
having the distribution of an NPI:89
(49) a. Ever the optimist, she said that it would work just fine. ∀
b. Don’t ever try this at home! ∃ (NPI)
Given this analysis of conditionals, embedding If you work hard you succeed
under only results in the following kind of logical form: ‘Among the events where
you work hard are ones resulting in success (lines a-c) and it’s not the case that
among the events where you work little there are events that lead to success, etc.
(lines d-f)’:
8 Whether any can also be analyzed as ambiguous between a universal and existential reading is of
course an obvious but complex question, the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
9 Several indigenous languages of the Pacific Northwest have been noted to have modal operators with
both universal or existential force. Particularly striking in the present context is the o’qa suffix in Nez
Perce, which according to Deal (2011) is existential in downward entailing contexts but ambiguous
elsewhere. Deal attributes this to o’qa being an existential operator that lacks a stronger scale mate.
At this point I do not fully understand if there is a relation between this kind of modal adverb and
the, in my view, ambiguous tacit adverbial quantifier in bare conditionals, or the ambiguous ever.
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(50) [[ιX : ∀e(E(e)↔ you-work-hard(e))] (a)
[∃e′ : E(e′)][∃E ′ : ∃e′′(E ′(e′′)∧∀e′(E ′(e′′)→ R(e′′,e′)))] (b)
[∀e′′′ : E ′(e′′′)]you-succeed (e′′′)] (c)
∧¬[[ιX : ∀e(E(e)↔you-work-little (e))] (d)
[∃e′ : E(e′)][∃E ′ : ∃e′′(E ′(e′′)∧∀e′(E ′(e′′)→ R(e′′,e′)))] (e)
[∀e′′′ : E ′(e′′′)]you-succeed (e′′′)] etc. (f)
9.2 Prediction regarding only if and perfected conditionals:
Turning now to conditionals with overt adverbs, we find that the tacit existential
adverb in only if conditionals is but a default and its force is over-ridden by that of an
overt adverb if there is one. Depending on the force of the overt adverb, (51) rules
out that anything other than hard work always/often/usually/never leads to success.
This follows if the conditional embedded under only has the logical form in (52):
(51) Only if you work HARD do you always/often/usually/never succeed.
(52) [ιX : ∀eE(e)∧ you-work-hard(e)] (a)
[All/Many...e′ : E(e′)][∃E ′ : ∃E ′′[E ′(e′′) ∧ ∀e′(E ′(e′′) →
R(e′′,e′))]]
(b)
[∀e′′′ : E ′(e′′′)] you-succeed(e′′′) (c)
Since on the present account conditional perfection arises from conjoining a
conditional S with a silent exhaustivized version of itself and only S we now expect
that just as with only if conditionals, perfected conditionals with overt adverbs
should also ‘inherit’ the force of the overt adverb if there is one. And, indeed, when
perfected (53) can be paraphrased as in (54), where the second conjunct is interpreted
as in (52). The if-clause denotes necessary and sufficient conditions not for success
but, depending on the force of the adverb, necessary and sufficient conditions for
inevitable/frequent/likely/non-realized success.
(53) If you work hard you always/often/usually/never succeed.
(54) If you work hard you always/often/usually/never succeed and only if you
work hard do you always/often/usually/never succeed.
10 Conclusion
Bare conditionals show duality between universal and existential readings, with
the latter appearing in downward entailing contexts. Bare plurals combining with
individual level predicates can be argued to behave similarly and to also show
629
Herburger
existential readings in downward entailing contexts. Conditional Perfection, upper-
bounding inference and the exhaustiveness of answers all arise when a sentence S,
expressing ‘the truth’, is silently conjoined with and only S, expressing ‘the whole
truth’. The whole truth theory is indebted to both the neo-Gricean approach to upper
bounding inferences and to the grammatical theory; like the neo-Gricean approach
the whole truth theory keeps separate the sentence (S) and its ‘implicature’ (only
S), and like the grammatical approach it relies on a silent operator, in particular a
silent but, in the case of the whole truth theory, otherwise completely synonymous
occurrence of the word only.
A Previous accounts of conditionals under negative quantifiers
I have argued that conditionals under negative quantifiers, like conditionals under
only, have only existential force (Herburger 2015). But of course there have been
previous accounts of this phenomenon, several of which I’d like to briefly discuss.
One approach to conditionals like (30b) or (55a) assigns if in this kind of environment
simply the meaning of and (Higginbotham 1986, cf. Dekker 2001). (55a) on this
account has the logical form in (55b), which would render it equivalent to (55c):
(55) a. No student will succeed if he or she goofs off.
b. ¬∃x (Student(x) ∧ Goof-off (x) ∧ Succeed(x))
c. No student will succeed and goof off.
Conceptually, this approach raises the specter of noncompositionality as if seems
to have one meaning in one environment and another in another context (Higgin-
botham 1986, 2003).10 Empirically, it is problematic in that (55a) and (55b)/(55c)
are not really equivalent (Leslie 2009): (55a) is falsified by Meadow, for example,
who will get a good grade no matter what because her mobster father pressures the
teacher. But if Meadow happens to work hard (maybe to spite Dad) she does not
actually falsify (55b)/(55c).
Another approach (von Fintel 1998) is to uniformly translate the if-clause as a
restrictor, a la Lewis/Kratzer for adverbs and modals, and to analyze (55a) as (56):
(56) No student who goofs off will succeed.
But, Meadow’s hard work again causes trouble, making the truth conditions of
(55a) and (56) come apart; though she will make (55a) false because Dad has taken
10 My analysis could of course also be faulted with this but I do not think that the meaning changes
depending on environment but that we are dealing with an ambiguity, where each reading seems
restricted to a particular context. Whether the strongest meaning hypothesis accounts for this distri-
bution or whether it is something else is, admittedly, a question that is relevant but left unanswered. I
hope to address it in future research.
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care of her grade, she will not falsify (56) because she does not actually goof off
(Higginbotham 2003; von Fintel & Iatridou 2002; Leslie 2009).11
A third approach explains conditionals under negative quantifiers by positing
(presupposing) CEM (and decomposition of the negative quantifiers). That such
an analysis is possible is noted in Higginbotham (2003), who, however, voices
reservations about CEM; not so von Fintel & Iatridou (2002), who argue for this
kind of account:
(57) [No x: Student(x)] [All w: Goof-off(x, in w)] Succeed (x, in w) ⇔
[All x: Student(x)] ¬[All w: Goof-off(x, in w)] Succeed (x, in w) ⇔
[All x: Student(x)] [All w: Goof-off(x, in w)] ¬Succeed (x, in w) (via CEM)
The problem with CEM is of course that if one assumes a (variable) strict
conditional analysis, as von Fintel & Iatridou (2002) do, CEM is a stipulation.
B Conditional duality and negation
One reason semanticists have toyed with CEM in the first place is that the negation
of a conditional often seems intuitively equivalent to the negation of its consequent.
(58 a-c) can all be taken to say that Mary’s goofing off will result in failure.
(58) a. It’s not true that Mary will succeed if she goofs off.
b. I don’t think that Mary will succeed if she goofs off.
c. Mary won’t succeed if she goofs off.
As noted in footnote 2, the analysis given by Stalnaker (1968, 1981) supports
CEM and thus captures this observation, but at the price of assuming that there
is a single closest possible world where the antecedent is true. The variably strict
conditional proposed in response in Lewis (1973) does not validate CEM, and, as
already noted, if CEM is to be used, it needs to be stipulated (von Fintel 1998; von
Fintel & Iatridou 2002).
Conditional Duality, in contrast, explains the fact without the need for CEM. That
the negation of a conditional should seem equivalent to the negation of its consequent
is due to the fact that, the identical phonology notwithstanding, we are not dealing
with the same conditional as the negated conditional actually has existential force
while the non-negated one has universal force. The observed equivalence thus
follows from a basic logical equivalence:
(59) ¬[∃w: Goof-off(j,w)] Succeed(j,w) ⇔ [∀w: Goof-off(j,w)] ¬Succeed(j,w)
11 A possible solution to save the restrictor theory is to modalize the restrictor, Leslie (2009), cf.
Klinedinst (2011) for a critique.
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This account might also help us make sense of instances where a negated condi-
tional does not actually seem equivalent to the negation of its consequent, which run
counter to CEM (and which pose problems for account of conditionals that support
CEM (Leslie 2009). It seems to me that examples like these arise where the negated
conditional denies a previous, strong conditional:
(60) A: If a fair coin is flipped it will land heads. F
B: If a fair coin is flipped it will NOT land heads. T
(61) If a fair coin is flipped it will land tails. F
The diverging truth values of (60B) and (61) show that here the negation of
entire conditional is not equivalent to negation of its consequent. This, I speculate,
is due to (60B) involving a metalinguistic denial negation, with (60B) being a direct
contradiction of (60A), including its universal quantificational force:
(62) ¬[∀w : [Ax: Fair-coin(x)] Flipped(x, w)] Land-heads(x, w) T
In contrast, when uttered in isolation the negated conditional in (62) is interpreted
as being existentially quantifed, creating the illusion of CEM:
(63) If a fair coin is flipped it will not land heads. F
(64) ¬[∃w : [Ax: Fair-coin(x)] Flipped(x, w)] Land-heads(x, w) F
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